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Abstract
Social choice provides methods for collective decisions. They include methods for voting and for aggregating rankings. These
methods are used in multiagent systems for similar purposes when decisions are to be made by agents. Votes and rankings
are sensitive information. Because of that, privacy mechanisms are needed to avoid the disclosure of sensitive information.
Cryptographic techniques can be applied in centralized environments to avoid the disclosure of sensitive information. A trusted
third party can then compute the outcome. In distributed environments, we can use a secure multiparty computation approach
for implementing a collective decision method. Other privacy models exist. Differential privacy and k-anonymity are two of
them. They provide privacy guarantees that are complementary to multiparty computation approaches, and solutions that can
be combined with the cryptographic ones, thus providing additional privacy guarantees, e.g., a differentially private multiparty
computation model. In this paper, we propose the use of probabilistic social choice methods to achieve differential privacy.
We use the method called random dictatorship and prove that under some circumstances differential privacy is satisfied and
propose a variation that is always compliant with this privacy model. Our approach can be implemented using a centralized
approach and also a decentralized approach. We briefly discuss these implementations.
Keywords Privacy · Social choice · Probabilistic social choice · Differential privacy · Random dictatorship
1 Introduction
Social choice provides mechanisms for making collective
decisions. They aggregate individual preferences and lead
to a summary of these preferences. Procedures for building
collective decisions have been defined and studied for a long
time.
Examples of well-known social choice mechanisms
include Condorcet and Borda methods, and quite a few elec-
toral systems. Condorcet and Borda methods are functions
of ranks that return a single winner. Electoral systems start
from individual preferences expressed in a variety of ways
and then return either a single winner or a set of winners.
Methods to aggregate preferences also exist. See, e.g., [3]
for some reference works in this area.
Arrow’s impossibility theorem [2] showed that when
designing amethod for aggregating preferences, a very small
set of requirements makes the problem overconstrained.
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That is, no method can be defined satisfying all require-
ments. Solutions exist when some of these requirements are
dropped. For example, methods exist for restricted domains
(e.g., single-peaked preferences) or, alternatively, methods
do not satisfy the condition of independence of irrele-
vant alternatives. Gibbard–Satterthwaite theorem [10,21] is
another impossibility theory for ordinal electoral systems
with a single winner.
Impossibility results have fostered the development of
solutions that try to minimize or overcome their negative
effects. The study of single-peaked preferences is an exam-
ple. When preferences are restricted to be of this type, there
are social choice mechanisms that satisfy all the axioms in
Arrow’s theorem.
Probabilistic social choice is a sub-field of social choice
in which the outcome of a mechanism is computed in terms
of a probability distribution. Interesting mechanisms have
been introduced. They can circumvent [5,7,19] the difficul-
ties of the Gibbard–Satterthwaite theorem, and they satisfy
some well-known properties of social choice. In this paper,
we will use methods belonging to this area of probabilis-
tic social choice. We will show that they can provide, under
some conditions, differential privacy.
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Social choice procedures are used for multiple purposes
in multiagent systems. In this area, however, preferences and
votes are sensitive information.
The goal of data privacy [25,28] is to provide mechanisms
to avoid the disclosure of sensitive information. On the one
hand, it provides a set of privacymodels that provides compu-
tational definitions of privacy. On the other hand, it provides
techniques so that systems and databases are compliant with
the privacy models, and/or measures to evaluate different
aspects related to privacy (e.g., disclosure risk and informa-
tion loss measures).
In this paper, we study the use of probabilistic social
choice as a way to implement private voting. As we discuss
later, this permits to obtain a voting mechanism that satisfies
differential privacy. The literature presents different alterna-
tives with respect to privacy and voting. We review them in
the next section and give more details on our goals.
1.1 Related work
The most straightforward way to implement any voting pro-
cedure is to followa centralized approach using a trusted third
party and use cryptography so that no information is leaked,
and the only information learnt by the agents is the outcome
of the function (i.e., the result of the voting procedure). Most
secure e-voting protocols [15] follow this approach. Never-
theless, this approach has two main drawbacks.
• One is that it needs this trusted third party and it is, thus,
a centralized approach not much appropriate in a multi-
agent system context. This problem can be solved using
a distributed (decentralized) approach, i.e., using secure
multiparty computation as our privacy model. However,
in this latter case, computational costs are higher, and
they can be prohibitive if the function to compute is
complex and the number of parties is very large. Exam-
ples of distributed secure e-voting protocols are found in
[9,20,29,30].
• Another drawback is that the outcome can give clues on
the participation of certain agents. Differential privacy is
an alternative privacy model that focuses on the result of
a calculation (i.e., the function or query computed from a
database). It is about this result being independent of the
presence or absence of a single agent. This is to ensure
the confidentiality on the participation of any agent. Note
that secure e-voting does not avoid this type of disclosure.
Other privacy models exist as well. For example, k-
anonymity, initially defined for databases, is aboutmodifying
(perturbing) a database so that for any record there are other
k − 1 records that are indistinguishable. Or, from another
perspective, that for any record the anonymity set (the set of
respondents that may have supplied the same information) is
of size at least k. In the case of preferences of agents, this
would correspond to having at least k agents with the same
preferences.
Note that differential privacy and k-anonymity are not in
contradiction with the privacy models that use cryptography.
For example, we can have a system implementing both the
securemultiparty computationmodel and the differential pri-
vacy model.
In this paper, we focus on privacy according to the dif-
ferential privacy model. In Sect. 5.1, we discuss briefly its
implementation in combination with the trusted third party
and the multiparty computation model to have additional pri-
vacy guarantees.
We study mechanisms for ensuring privacy in the appli-
cation of social choice methods for multiagent systems. The
literature on this topic is limited. In [16–18], authors study
privacy for mechanism design. They focus on the differen-
tial privacy model. In particular, [16] focuses on auctions,
[17] on monopolist pricing and facility location, and [18]
includes a differentially private poll. The approach in [18] is
described as also following the secure multiparty computa-
tion model. Chen et al. [8] follow a similar approach, also
in the context of multiagent systems. The paper proposes a
mechanism (Mechanism 4.1) satisfying differential privacy
for a two-candidate election.
In [24] (Chapter 5), k-anonymity is studied for prefer-
ences. The goal is to build sets of at least k preferences and
build an aggregated preference for each set. To build these
sets, two different types of distances between preferences are
considered: discrete distance (where any pair of preferences
is at a distance one) and swap distance (where a preference
is at a distance one of another that only differs on a swap
between consecutive options). The author considers two vot-
ing rules: the plurality rule and the Condorcet rule.
Our approach on privacy for social choice is different.
We consider the differential privacy model in combination
with probabilistic social choice. Probabilistic social choice
is naturally based on randomness. The use of randomness in
elections has an old history (see, e.g., [7]). Sortition or allot-
ment as a way to elect officials was used already in ancient
Athens and inmedieval ages (e.g., North Italy andCatalonia).
Probabilistic social choice models have been recently recon-
sidered. They have interesting properties and, as we have
stated above, they are a way to circumvent the Gibbard–
Satterthwaite theorem. From our perspective, probabilistic
social choice mechanisms fit well with differential privacy,
as methods compliant with differential privacy are typically
implemented in terms of randomization. Although not all
probabilistical social choice methods are differentially pri-
vate, some satisfy this property under certain circumstances.
Randomsocial choice is naturally not a valid procedure for
all types of contexts in which decisions are made within mul-
tiagent systems. Nevertheless, there are situations in which
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this type of procedures is useful. They are cases where ran-
domness does not have a dramatic effect and can even be
beneficial. Consider the case of simulated annealing and
other search procedures that include a randomization com-
ponent. In our case, we are particularly interested in its
application in the context of reinforcement learning and fed-
erated learning. This corresponds to situations in which the
decision is not final but an iterative process. In this case, ran-
domized social choice can be useful. Actual application in a
real environment is out of the scope of this paper.
For example, consider a cohort of drones guiding a ter-
restrial vehicle. Drones vote continuously for landmarks that
are used to guide the vehicle. The selected landmarks at any
time are not so important as it is the overall set (a rough path)
that will really affect the trajectory of the vehicle. Under this
scenario, we would consider local differential privacy or dif-
ferential privacy with a budget so that each drone can vote
several times.
Similar scenarios can be considered in federated learning.
In this case, mobile devices of users need to affect the learned
model by means of their vote, but it is the long run what is
of relevance, not the result of the voting at a particular time.
In this paper, we study random dictatorship in light of dif-
ferential privacy, and then we introduce a variation of this
method that satisfies differential privacy. Our definition fol-
lows a centralized approach that can be thus combined with
a secure multiparty computation protocol to avoid the dis-
closure of the votes of the agents. Improving in this way the
privacy is guaranteed by differential privacy.
1.2 Structure of the paper
The structure of this paper is as follows. In Sect. 2, we review
briefly probabilistic social choice. In Sect. 3, we review the
definition of differential privacy. In Sect. 4, we study random
dictatorship in light of differential privacy and prove themain
theorem of the paper. In Sect. 5, we introduce a differentially
private method for random dictatorship. The paper finishes
with some conclusions and lines for future work.
2 Probabilistic social choice
In this section, we review a few methods of probabilistic
social choice. We will consider a set I of T agents and a
set A of m alternatives. Each agent i ∈ I = {1, . . . , T } has
associated a preference relation i on the set of alternatives.
All preference relations i are subsets of A× A, and they
are reflexive, complete and transitive. Recall that a relation
i on A is reflexive if for all ar ∈ A it holds ar i ar , it is
complete if for any ar ∈ A and as ∈ A we have either ar i
as or as i ar , and it is transitive if for any ar , as, at ∈ A it
holds that ar i as and as i at implies ar i at . As usual
we use i to denote the corresponding relation that is not
reflexive (i.e., ar i as if and only if ar i as but ar = as).
Using the example in the introduction, I is the set of drones
and T the number of drones. A corresponds to the set of pos-
sible landmarks. At any time, each drone i has a preference
on the landmarks and this defines the preference relation i
(i.e., ar i as if the i th drone prefers the landmark r to the
landmark s).
2.1 Random dictatorship
Given the set of agents I with the corresponding preference
relations i for i ∈ I on the alternatives A, uniform random
dictatorship proceeds as follows.
Method 1 It selects an agent i in I according to a uniform
distributionon I , and thenusesi to select themost preferred
alternative by agent i as outcome.
This method has been studied by several authors, and, for
example, there is a theorem that characterizes it in terms of
anonymity, strong SD-strategyproof and ex post-efficiency
when preferences are strict. See [7,11]. The method as
explained here iswell defined for strict preferences. There are
variations that allow for non-strictness. We do not consider
them in this paper.
2.2 Other methods
There are othermethods based on lotteries. See, e.g., [6,7] for
details. There are methods based on Borda’s rule, e.g., ran-
dom selection among the alternatives with a maximal score,
or random selection proportional to Borda scores. There are
also methods based on maximal lotteries.
3 Differential privacy
Differential privacy is to ensure that the outputs of a function
(or query) do not depend too much on a particular record or
individual. In order to ensure this, the outputs of the function
when applied to two databases that only differ in one record
should be similar enough. The formalization assumes that the
function is not deterministic but that we have a probability
distribution on the space of outputs, and then it is expected
that the two probability distributions obtained from the appli-
cation of the function to the two databases are similar.
We give now its definition. In the definition, D1 and D2
are the two arbitrary databases that differ only in one record.
Then, A(D1) is the application of the algorithm or function to
D1 and S is a subset of the space of outputs of the algorithm.
The definition depends on a parameter ε that permits us
to control the level of privacy. A large ε permits that the
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function is changed significantlywhen a new record is added.
In Sect. 4, we discuss briefly some values of ε used in the
literature. Note that in general the selection of ε is an open
problem.
Definition 1 An algorithm A gives ε-differential privacy if
for all data sets D1 and D2 differing at most one element,
and all S ⊆ Range(A), it holds
Pr(A(D1) ∈ S)
Pr(A(D2) ∈ S) ≤ e
ε (1)
In this definition, ε is the parameter to control the privacy
level. The smaller the ε, the greater the privacy.
When a set of agents I is considered, andwe are interested
in computing a function of agents opinions (i.e., i ), we can
consider two frameworks. The first one is as described in the
definition of differential privacy above that D1 and D2 can
differ in a record or agent. This implies that agents can opt
out to take part in the collective decision-making process.
Alternatively, we may consider that all agents in our mul-
tiagent system are required to take part in the collective
decision-making process. In this case, D1 and D2 will have
the same size (i.e., the same set of agents) but there is one
agent that differs in its contribution (i.e., i has changed).
This later approach is similar to the one in [17].
Consider the running example presented in the introduc-
tion. The first case is that in each voting process only some
of the drones are available for voting. Here, availability can
mean that they can communicate to each other, or that they
have a preference on a landmark and want to communicate
this preference for voting. It can also be the case that some
drones decide not to participate because their privacy budget
is exhausted, or because their internal budget management
rules decide not to participate. In the second case, all drones
vote in all voting processes. In the scenario for federated
learning also mentioned in the introduction, both cases are
also relevant. We may consider the case that only a subset of
devices is used for computing partial decisions, and the case
that all devices are required to update a machine learning
model.
4 Differential privacy for probabilistic social
choice functions
We study in this section conditions on the satisfaction of dif-
ferential privacy. We begin considering random dictatorship
(see Sect. 2.1) in the case that agents can decide whether they
participate or not. The result assumes that the voting proce-
dure takes place if at least T agents participate. Later, we
consider the case where participation is mandatory.
The following theorem shows that although in general dif-
ferential privacy is not satisfied, there are scenarios in which
it holds. We will use these results later in Sect. 5 to define a
method that always satisfies differential privacy.
Theorem 1 Let us consider a set I of T agents, a set A with
at least two alternatives, and preferences i for i ∈ I . Then,
random dictatorship satisfies the following properties with
respect to differential privacy.
– (i) The procedure does not satisfy differential privacy in
general.
– (ii) When there is at least one agent that supports each








where T ≥ 3 is the number of agents.
– (iii) When there is at least an α% of agents that support
the least represented option, we have
– (iii.a) that for a set of agents of size T , the method
satisfies ε-differential privacy for ε s.t.
ε ≥ log αT + 100
α(T + 1) (3)
– (iii.b) that ε-differential privacy is satisfied for any
set of agents with a size larger than
size ≥ 100 − αe
ε
α(eε − 1) ,
for any α ≤ 100T2T+1 .
Proof To prove this theorem, we consider A(D) as the algo-
rithm for random dictatorship. Therefore, the range of A(D)
is the set of possible outcomes, i.e., the set of alternatives.
We assume that there are at least two alternatives.
The first consideration is that we do not need to deal with
all sets S, but only to consider that it holds for alternatives
a0 in A. That is, we have ε-differential privacy when
Pr(A(D1) = a0)
Pr(A(D2) = a0) ≤ e
ε
for all a0 ∈ A. This is so because if this equation holds for
a0 and a1, then it holds for S = {a0, a1} and by induction for
all S ⊆ A.
The definition of differential privacy requires that Eq. 1
is satisfied for all set of agents D1 and D2 that differ in one
agent. We will consider two cases, depending on whether D1
is the larger or the smaller set. Using D ∪ {a} to denote the
set of agents D enlarged with one additional agent, these two
cases correspond to the following equations
123
Random dictatorship for privacy-preserving social choice
– Case 1
Pr(A(D ∪ {a}) = a0)




Pr(A(D ∪ {a}) = a0) ≤ e
ε .
Now, taking into account the algorithm for random dic-
tatorship, Pr(A(D) = a0) corresponds to the proportion
of agents that have a0 as their first option. Let Na0 be the
number of agents with such first option. Then, Pr(A(D) =
a0) = Na0/T where T is the number of agents in D. That is,
T = |D|. We can obtain the following expressions for cases










= Na0(T + 1)
Na0T
≤ eε .
We can summarize these two inequalities as a condition





T + 1 ≤ e
ε . (4)
In contrast, when the added agent selects a0 we can deduce
the following inequalities:
– Case 1b
(1 + Na0)/(T + 1)
Na0/T





(Na0 + 1)/(T + 1)
= Na0(T + 1)
(Na0 + 1)T
≤ eε .
It is easy to see that the most sensible case is when Na0
is equal to zero and, thus, it corresponds to the case that
we add an agent that selects an alternative that has not been
considered before by any other agent. The probability of this
alternative being selectedwill change from zero to 1/(T +1),
and, thus, the equation of case 1b does not hold for any ε and,
therefore, no ε satisfies differential privacy. This proves the
first result [case (i)].
In order to prove the second result [case (ii)], we consider
the most extreme cases that are when Na0 = 1 and when
Na0 = T − 1. It is easy to see that case 1b when Na0 = 1
corresponds to:
2T
T + 1 ≤ e
ε (5)
and, thus, it is implied by Eq. 2.
In this case, we do not need to consider case 2b because
(2b) with Na0 = 1 corresponds to (T + 1)/(2T ) ≤ eε which
for T ≥ 1 is true for any ε ≥ 0.
When Na0 = T − 1, case 1b leads to T 2/((T − 1)(T +
1)) ≤ eε . This function is decreasing and with T = 3 equals
0.117. In contrast, 2T /(T + 1) is increasing and with T = 3
is 0.405. Therefore, T ≥ 3 satisfying Eq. 2 will also satisfy
case 1b. Case 2b is always true: (T −1)(T +1)/T 2 = (T 2−
1)/T 2 < 1 ≤ eε for ε ≥ 0.
Let us now consider the proof of Eq. 4 (i.e., cases 1a and
1b). Observe that now the value of Na0 does not play a role.
First, we have that Eq. 2 eε > 2T /(T + 1) implies the right-
hand side of Eq. 4 because
T
T + 1 ≤
2T
T + 1 < e
ε . (6)
Equation 2 is equivalent to 1/eε < (T +1)/2T . Naturally
if (T +1)/2T < T /(T +1), then the left-hand side of Eq. 4 is
proven. To prove that Eq. 2 implies (T +1)/2T < T /(T +1)
for T ≥ 3, just rewrite it as 0 < 2T 2 − (T + 1)(T + 1) =
2T 2−T 2−2T −1 = T 2−2T −1. So, the equality holds for
T = 1±√2 and it naturally holds for T ≥ 3. This completes
the proof of the second result of the theorem [i.e., (ii) above].
To prove the third result [i.e., (iii) above], we consider
again the two cases (a) and (b) taking Na0 as αT /100. For
case (a), we need to see (case 2a) that (T + 1)/T ≤ eε holds
with ε ≥ (αT + 100)/(α(T + 1)). Then, if
T + 1
T
≤ αT + 100
α(T + 1) ≤ e
ε
the case is proven. As
T + 1
T
≤ αT + 100
α(T + 1)
can be rewritten as α ≤ 100T /(2T + 1) and this is precisely
the condition for α in (iii), the case is proven.
The other condition (i.e., case 1a) T /(T + 1) ≤ eε holds
as T /(T + 1) ≤ 1 ≤ eε for ε ≥ 0.
For case b, case (2b) is trivial because
α(T + 1)
αT + 100 =
αT + α


























Fig. 1 Values of ε according to Eq. 2 (i.e., ε = log(2 ∗ t/(t + 1))
because α ≤ 50 < 100.
Case (1b) is just the condition of the third result ((αT +
100)/(α(T + 1)) ≤ eε .
This completes the proof of (iii.a). Condition (iii.b) about
the size is obtained rewriting the one for ε and observing that
α(eε − 1) is always positive for ε ≥ 0. 
We illustrate now this theorem with some examples.
We need to consider the problem of setting the parameter
ε. This is an open problem in differential privacy. It is often
used an ε below one for an effective privacy level. We recall
that in [14], values for ε were recommendedwhen computing
mean and median. These values were ε = 0.3829 and ε =
2.776, respectively. In addition, according to [4], Apple uses
in some applications an ε = 4, and according to [12] uses
ε = 6 and ε = 14. Recall that the larger the ε, the lesser the
protection.
The second result of this theorem implies that in a multia-
gent system, a small ε can be obtained (under the assumption
that there is at least one agent supporting each alternative).
Note that when the number of voters is 10, we have differen-
tial privacy with ε = 0.5978. For large number of voters, ε
tends to be log(2) = 0.6931. Figure 1 shows different ε for a
set of voters between 3 and 150. This result can also be seen
in the other way round, i.e., the appropriate size for a given
ε.
In relation to the third result of this theorem, note that the
condition of α ≤ 100T /(2T + 1) (this function is displayed
in Fig. 2) is a necessary condition when considered together
with Eq. 3, but this is not a sufficient condition. Any ε larger
than log[(T + 1)/T ] will be valid for all α. In this result,
we assume that there is always a minimum percentage for
the alternative with the minimum support. This implies that












Fig. 2 Upper bound for valid values of α according to case (iii) in
Theorem 1 [i.e., α ≤ 100T /(2T + 1)]










Fig. 3 Values of ε according to Eq. 3 for α = 2% [i.e., log((2 ∗ t +
100)/(2 ∗ (t + 1)))]
the shape of the function is different from the previous result
where the percentageof supporting agents is decreasingwhen
the number of agents increases. Figure 3 shows the values of
ε for α = 2% (and for different number of agents). The same
applies when a larger number of votes is obtained by the
option with less support.
These results show that while differential privacy is not
always satisfied, under the assumption that there is at least
one vote per alternative, differential privacy is guaranteed
with a reasonable ε.
We have discussed in Sect. 3 that we can consider two
frameworks in the case of agents voting in a multiagent sys-
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tem. One is that the agents can opt out in the voting process
and another in which this is not possible and all are required
to vote. Theorem 1 considers the case that participation was
not mandatory. Let us consider now the case that all agents
are required to vote.
Theorem 2 Let us consider the same assumptions as in Theo-
rem 1. Then, when agents cannot opt out, the following holds
for the random dictatorship.
– The procedure does not satisfy differential privacy in gen-
eral.
– When there is at least one agent that supports each alter-
native, differential privacy is satisfied for any ε larger
than log(2) = 0.6931.
– When there is at least an α% of agents that support the
least represented option, we have
– that for a set of agents of size T , the method satisfies
ε-differential privacy for ε s.t.
ε ≥ log αT + 100
αT
(7)
– that ε-differential privacy is satisfied for any set of
agents with a size larger than
size ≥ 100
α(eε − 1) . (8)
Proof In order to prove this result, we can reconsider the
proof of the previous theorem. We can use the example used
in the proof of the first statement in the previous theorem to
prove the first statement here (i.e., Na0 = 0).
The proof of the second statement uses the expressions for
cases 1 and 2. Cases 1a and 2a are always satisfied as they





The most extreme case for this expression is when Na0 = 1
and Na0 = T − 2, and the maximal value for ε will be at
Na0 = 1where it results log(2) ≤ ε. Values for large Na0 lead
to smaller ε. In contrast, Case 2b is always true. Therefore,
the second statement of the theorem is proven.
The proof of the third statement follows the same structure
considered in the previous theorem. For cases 1b and 2b, we







αT + 100 ≤ e
ε .
Then, as αT ≤ αT + 100, Case 2b is true for any ε ≥ 0. So,
we only need to consider the expression in Case 1b, and from
it, we get Expression 7. Similarly, we obtain Expression 8. 
This theoremshows that this frameworkpermits to achieve
differential privacy with a low value for ε but that this value
does not change with the number of agents. That is, ε =
log(2) = 0.6931 when there is at least one voter for each
alternative. In contrast, Eq. 7 is similar to the one obtained
in the previous theorem.
5 Differentially private random dictatorship
The results obtained in the previous section analyzing ran-
dom dictatorship in light of differential privacy permit us
to introduce a simple variation of the method that satisfies
differential privacy.
The procedure is as follows. We call this method differ-
entially private random dictatorship.
Method 2 Let A = {a1, . . . , am} be the set of alternatives.
Then, given the set of agents I with the corresponding pref-
erence relationsi for i ∈ I on the alternatives A, enlarge I
with a set of agents I0 = {e1, . . . , em} such thati for i ∈ I0
has as its preferred alternative the i th alternative in A.
Then, apply uniform random dictatorship on I ∪ I0.
We have the following result for this method.
Lemma 1 Differentially private random dictatorship satis-
fies differential privacy for any ε ≥ log 2|I∪I0||I∪I0|+1 .
The proof of this lemma is a consequence of the second
condition in the results of the previous section (Expression 2).
The procedurewehave introducedhere can also be applied
when agents’ participation to the voting is compulsory. This
is defined as follows. We call this method differentially pri-
vate compulsory random dictatorship.
Method 3 Define one agent per alternative as in Method 2,
and then select one among the previously existing ones union
the ones created, and then use their decision.
The following lemma is a consequence of the correspond-
ing theorem proven in the previous section.
Lemma 2 Differentially private compulsory random dicta-




The implementation of differentially private random dic-
tatorship using a trusted third party can be done using
cryptography and secure communication techniques. This
will result into a method that will protect both the privacy of
the votes and the participation or not of an agent (i.e., sat-
isfy differential privacy). Nevertheless, this approach will be
centralized.
In order to implement these methods in a distributed way
so that they satisfy not only differential privacy but also the
secure multiparty model, we can use somemethods that have
already been defined in the literature.
A detailed implementation and a security proof is out of
the scope of this paper. Some hints for its implementation
follow. On the one hand, we can first build a random order of
the agents. See, e.g., [1,22] that consider a secret ordering of
the agents. For a non-secret ordering, see, e.g., [23]. Then,
for a generation of a random number, see, e.g., [13]. Finally,
we will need to get privately the answer of the selected agent
(a private selection protocol). Private information retrieval
methods (see, e.g., [25]) could also be used to provide a
partially distributed approach.
6 Summary and conclusions
In this paper, we have considered a method for collective
decision that belongs to the area of probabilistic social choice
in light of differential privacy. That is, we want to avoid dis-
closing the participation of a certain agent. At the same time,
we want that the voting procedure has a low information
loss / large utility, in the sense that the preferences of the
agents are taken into account. We have proven that under
some conditions, a probabilistic social choice method satis-
fies differential privacy for appropriate values of ε. We have
introduced Methods 2 and 3 that provide differential privacy
(see Lemmas 1 and 2, respectively).
Then, taking advantage of the results obtained, we have
defined a variant that satisfies differential privacy. We have
proven that somemethods of probabilistic social choice inte-
grate well with differential privacy. Not all methods within
probabilistic social choice are suitable for differential pri-
vacy. For example,Bordamax (see [7]) that selects alternatives
randomly among the oneswith amaximal Borda count seems
to be unsuitable for achieving differential privacy (or may
require an important modification that can invalidate known
theoretical results).
Our goal is to provide differentially private solutions that
are also useful and sound from a social choice perspective.
For this purpose, we can consider two approaches. One is to
adapt existing classical social choice methods, which may
result into new mechanisms that in the adaptation process
will probably lose the nice properties that the original mech-
anisms satisfy. The other is to start with probabilistic social
choice methods. If minimal or no transformation is needed
to satisfy differential privacy, the methods will still keep the
properties of the originalmethod.Weconsider that the second
option is preferable, and it is the one considered in this paper.
Solutions for data privacy are often compared in terms of
the trade-off between utility and privacy. In differential pri-
vacy, once the ε parameter is settled, competing methods are
evaluated in terms of utility. In our context, we consider that
utility will be strongly dependent on the application, and,
thus, difficult to evaluate. It is relevant to observe that in
voting, it is often assumed that voters possess ordinal utility
functions. That is, it is the order between alternatives that is
relevant, and when numbers are used for ranking, they can
only be compared with respect to order but neither added nor
subtracted. Note that an arbitrary assignment of numerical
utilities consistent with preferences, majority voting does not
necessarily maximize the sum of the utilities (i.e., an alterna-
tive considered by all as second can accumulate more utility
than the first alternative of the majority). If cardinal scales
are used for utilities, aggregation and selection (as in mul-
ticriteria decision making) are preferable to voting [26,27].
Experimentation in different scenarios as the onesmentioned
in the introduction is left for future work.
As future work, wewill also consider other methods in the
area, e.g., applying our approach to the method that selects
alternatives according to a probability distribution propor-
tional to Borda scores.We also consider the case of coalitions
of agents to infer opinions from others.
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